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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Survey evidence is often used to address disputed issues of fact in 
intellectual property and other areas of the law.1  Survey evidence has played 
a special role in advertising law, by helping to determine the messages 
received by members of the intended audience exposed to advertising.2  This 
paper will address that role, and attempt to identify trends and offer 
comments and suggestions. 
Although courts have typically referred to such studies as “consumer 
surveys,” the intended audience of an advertising message is not necessarily 
“consumers” as that word is normally used. The audience could be 
professionals, such as healthcare professionals, or non-consumer groups, 
such as retailers.  For the purposes of this paper, a survey of an intended or 
target audience conducted to determine the message communicated by an 
advertising claim is referred to as a “communication survey.” 
II.  RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF SURVEYS; OVERVIEW OF LEGAL 
ISSUES  
A.  Use of Surveys in Lanham Act False Advertising Disputes 
The use of survey evidence in advertising disputes is most common in 
lawsuits brought by a marketer challenging the advertising of a competitor 
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.3 
 
 1.   See, e.g., Jacob Jacoby, 1 TRADEMARK SURVEYS, DESIGNING, IMPLEMENTING, AND 
EVALUATING SURVEYS § 1.20, 44–56 (A.B.A., 2013). 
 2.   See Jacob Jacoby et al., Survey Evidence in Deceptive Advertising Cases Under the Lanham 
Act: An Historical Review of Comments from the Bench, 84 Trademark Rep. 541, 544–76 (1994) 
(reviewing and analyzing the use of surveys in Lanham Act litigation up to the 1990s); E. Deborah Jay, 
Ten Truths of False Advertising Surveys, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 1116, 1120–71 (2013) (cataloguing 
issues in the design of communication surveys). 
 3.   See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014) (holding there is no consumer standing under the Lanham Act). 
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1.  Elements of Section 43(a) Claim 
Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act proscribes any “false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . in 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities . . . .”4  The Supreme Court 
has held that “to come within the zone of interests in a suit for false 
advertising under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial 
interest in reputation or sales.”5 
The elements of a Lanham Act 43(a)(1)(B) claim have been set forth as 
follows: (1) a false statement of fact by the defendant in a commercial 
advertisement about its own or another’s product; (2) the statement actually 
deceived or has the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its audience; 
(3) the deception is material, in that it is likely to influence the purchasing 
decision; (4) the defendant caused its false statement to enter interstate 
commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be injured as a result 
of the false statement, either by direct diversion of sales from itself to 
defendant or by a lessening of the goodwill associated with its products.6 
Court decisions often state that when an advertisement is literally false, 
consumer deception is presumed, and “the court may grant relief without 
reference to the advertisement’s [actual] impact on the buying public.”7  
However, where an advertisement is literally true but misleading, the 
advertisement “has left an impression on the listener that conflicts with 
reality,” and extrinsic evidence, in the form of a consumer confusion survey, 
is typically required.8 
 
 4.   15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
 5.   Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1390. 
 6.   See, e.g., Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams, Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 462 (5th Cir. 2001); 
Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 689 (6th Cir. 2000); Blue Dane Simmental 
Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 1999); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover 
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 
958, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 7.   Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982), superseded by 
statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6), as recognized in Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 
979 (2d Cir. 1988); see Osmose, Inc. v. Viance, LLC, 612 F.3d 1298, 1319 (11th Cir. 2010); Cashmere 
& Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 (1st Cir. 2002); Balance Dynamics Corp. 
v. Schmitt Indus., 204 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that while “a plaintiff need not 
demonstrate actual customer deception in order to obtain relief under the Lanham Act, . . . the ‘literal 
falsity’ rule has never permitted a plaintiff to recover marketplace damages without other proof that such 
damages occurred”). 
 8.   Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 229 (2d Cir. 1999); see PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead 
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 2011); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800 
Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002); Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 
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2.  Distinguishing Between Literal and Implied Claims 
In the author’s view, the formulation set forth above distinguishing 
literally false advertising messages and misleading messages, as well as the 
use of the term “impact,” tends to misstate the proper role of a 
communication survey in advertising litigation.  For example, express claims 
such as, “XYZ automobile gets 30 miles per gallon in city driving,” or “ABC 
medication is more effective for relief of back pain than regular strength 
aspirin,” are clearly literal claims.  In clearly literal claims, the messages are 
sufficiently unambiguous that no survey is necessary to assess their meaning.  
Whether the challenger can meet its burden of proof to show that the 
assertions are false will depend on product performance evidence, not survey 
evidence. 
Now consider the phrase “impact on the buying public.”  Does this 
mean “impact” in that the advertising affected purchase decisions, and, if so, 
to what degree?  Many consumers may choose not to believe an advertising 
message that is shown in court to be false, while others may accept the 
message as accurate but choose not to be influenced by it in their purchasing 
decisions.  And, if the false claim is non-comparative and there are many 
competitors, measuring the market “impact” of the false claim will likely be 
difficult.  Nevertheless, if an unambiguous claim is false (i.e. “literally 
false”), the Lanham Act, and state deception law, presumably provides for 
an injunctive remedy, assuming the other elements, including materiality, are 
met, because it is illogical and inequitable that a marketer should be free to 
disseminate a false material advertising claim, even if the “impact on the 
buying public” cannot be demonstrated or quantified. 
An example of an ambiguous claim is provided by United Industries 
Corp. v. Clorox Co.9 At issue was the claim that a product “kills roaches in 
24 hours.”10  The court held that the claim was not literally false, because the 
consumer message could have been that roaches that came into contact with 
the advertiser’s product died within twenty-four hours—an apparently true 
statement—or that all or most roaches in the infestation were eliminated 
within twenty-four hours—an apparently false statement.11  A 
communication survey could, in that case, have determined whether the 
target audience received the challenged message.  But, assuming that the 
 
14 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 
F.2d 294, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 9.   United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 10.   Id. at 1181. 
 11.   Id. 
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challenged message had been communicated to a not-insubstantial 
percentage of the target audience, the communication part of the survey 
would still not have measured the impact, or degree of impact, on purchase 
decisions.  In other words, a communication survey cannot address what 
impact the message had. 
A preferred way to describe the role of a communication survey is to 
avoid the tendency to refer to “literally false messages” versus “misleading 
messages,” but rather to distinguish between literal messages—whether true 
or false—compared to implied messages—whether true or false.  This 
formulation recognizes that other evidence will determine whether the 
message communicated, either literally or by implication, can be shown to 
be false, and additional evidence will be needed to measure the impact of a 
false claim (literal or by implication) on purchase decisions.  Evidence of 
impact could be survey evidence, but the survey would be measuring 
something in addition to message communication. 
3.  Use of Survey Evidence to Discern the Message Communicated by 
Advertising Claims 
Under the Lanham Act, as noted, a competitor can challenge as false an 
advertising claim that delivers a literal message without extrinsic evidence 
of the consumer message.12  An example would be: “You’re just not gonna 
get the best picture out of some fancy big screen TV without DIRECTV.  It’s 
broadcast in 1080i.”13  The Second Circuit found that that claim was “flatly 
untrue; the uncontroverted factual record establishes that viewers can, in fact, 
get the same ‘best picture’ by ordering HD programming from their cable 
service provider.”14  Communication surveys are accordingly not relevant if 
the opposing party is challenging the literal or unambiguous message 
communicated by an advertising claim.15 
A number of Lanham Act decisions have held that if an advertising 
claim is on its face susceptible to two or more plausible meanings, it cannot 
be literally false.16  In that scenario, the challenger will need to show, usually 
 
 12.   See, e.g., Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 13.   Id. 
 14.   Id. 
 15.   See Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 202 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(properly ignoring survey evidence offered by advertiser to purportedly show that claims were 
ambiguous, and thus not literally false, where the statements were found to be literal). 
 16.  DIRECTV, 497 F.3d at 158; Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 587 (3d Cir. 2002); Millennium Labs., Inc. v. Ameritox, Ltd., 924 
F. Supp. 2d 594, 600 (D. Md. 2013); In re Century 21-RE/MAX Real Estate Advert. Claims Litig., 882 
F. Supp. 915, 923 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
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with survey evidence, that the challenged plausible interpretation is being 
received by a not-insubstantial number of members of the target audience.17 
4.  Claims Considered Literal by Necessary Implication 
Included within the scope of literal messages are those conveyed by 
“necessary implication.”  A message is “conveyed by necessary implication 
when, considering the advertisement in its entirety, the audience would 
recognize the claim as readily as if it had been explicitly stated.”18  In such 
circumstance, because the meaning of the advertisement is apparent and not 
open to multiple interpretations, survey evidence is unnecessary to determine 
that the message conveyed is not the narrow, literal one. 
An illustrative example is found in the DIRECTV case.19  In that case, 
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that an advertisement 
praising the “amazing picture clarity of DIRECTV HD” such that “‘settling 
for cable would be illogical,’ considered in light of the advertisement as a 
whole, unambiguously made the false claim that cable’s HD picture quality 
is inferior to that of DIRECTV’s,” even though the inferiority was not stated 
directly.20  The court noted that where the “words or images, considered in 
context, necessarily imply a false message, the advertisement is literally false 
and no extrinsic evidence of consumer confusion is required.”21 
5.  Challenging a Non-Literal Message 
Lanham Act courts have, on numerous occasions, stated that while an 
advertising statement may be literally true, it can nevertheless be misleading 
in context.22  Courts have indicated that a communication survey is relevant, 
and sometimes necessary, to challenge a non-literal advertising message.23 
 
 17.   See infra Section (I)(A)(5) for discussion on the necessary level of confusion that must be 
shown by such a survey. 
 18.   Clorox Co. P.R. v. Procter & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2000).  Most 
federal circuits have recognized the necessary implication doctrine.  See, e.g., DIRECTV, 497 F.3d at 
158; Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 274 (4th Cir. 2002); Southland Sod Farms v. Stover 
Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 19.   DIRECTV, 497 F.3d at 158. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   See, e.g., Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004); Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle 
Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 820 (7th Cir. 1999); United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 
(8th Cir. 1998); BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 1081, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 23.   See Clorox Co. P.R., 228 F.3d at 36; United Indus. Corp., 140 F.3d at 1182–83; Southland Sod 
Farms, 108 F.3d at 1140. 
3 PLEVAN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  2:58 PM 
56 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:1 
For example, in Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-
Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co.,24 the product name “Mylanta Night 
Time Strength” for an antacid was at issue.  The parties disagreed as to 
whether an advertisement for this product conveyed the literal message that 
the product was effective when taken before sleeping.  The Third Circuit 
affirmed a finding by the district court that a consumer survey showing 
anywhere between 15% to 25% confusion among consumers was sufficient 
to show that the challenger would likely be able to prove that the product 
name implied “a false message that the product is specially formulated for 
nighttime relief,” or that the combination of the “name and label misled a 
substantial portion of consumers to believe that the product provided all-
night relief.”25 
6.  Rationale for the Use of Survey Evidence to Determine Implied 
Messages 
Reliance on surveys to construe advertising messages dates back to at 
least 1976 with District Judge Morris Lasker’s frequently quoted rationale in 
American Brands Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.26 In that case, the court 
observed that literally true statements  still violate the Lanham Act if they 
have “a tendency to mislead, confuse or deceive.”27  In such cases, although 
a court could interpret the advertisement, “the court’s reaction is at best not 
determinative and at worst irrelevant.  The question in such cases is: What 
does the person to whom the advertisement is addressed find to be the 
message?”28  The court held that the challenger failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the competitor cigarette manufacturer’s 
advertisement “Now. 2mg ‘tar’ is lowest” had a tendency to mislead or 
deceive, due to the challenger’s failure to produce a reliable consumer 
survey.29 
In 1978, the Second Circuit, in American Home Products Corp. v. 
Johnson & Johnson,30 cited Judge Lasker’s rationale and held that it was 
proper for the district court to evaluate consumer response data to determine 
whether the challenged advertising conveyed a misleading superiority 
message.  The challenger, the manufacturer of Tylenol, argued that its 
 
 24.   290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 25.   Id. at 594–95. 
 26.   413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 27.   Id. at 1357. 
 28.   Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.   577 F.2d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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competitor’s advertising misleadingly conveyed that the defendant’s pain-
reliever, Anacin, was superior to Tylenol in reducing pain when, in actuality, 
the two products relieved pain to an equal extent.  The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that two advertisements highlighting 
Anacin’s anti-inflammatory properties conveyed a false message of superior 
pain relief, even though Tylenol has no anti-inflammatory properties.31 
7.  Use of Surveys Rejected When Advertising Message Is 
Unambiguous 
In recent years, several decisions have held that survey evidence is 
inadmissible where the advertising message at issue is literally true.32  One 
rationale is that surveys may only measure the degree to which consumers 
misunderstood the message, rather than the degree to which they were 
misled.33  Giving weight to surveys that measure misunderstandings of 
facially truthful or unambiguous messages could reduce advertising to 
“meaningless puffery” aimed to protect a company from unanticipated 
misinterpretations.34  Applying that observation, the Seventh Circuit in Mead 
Johnson held that “survey research [cannot be] used to determine the 
meaning of words, or to set the standard to which objectively verifiable 
claims must be held.”35  In that case, Judge Easterbrook refused to consider 
a communication survey submitted to show that the phrase “1st Choice of 
Doctors” on infant formula packaging conveyed a misleading message to 
consumers because the message was literally true—the advertiser’s product 
was recommended by more doctors than any competing infant formula.36 
Similarly, in Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc.,37 the 
district court considered whether branding rum “Havana Club,” even though 
the label clearly stated that it was made in Puerto Rico, was misleading on 
the theory that the mark implied that the rum was made in Cuba.  Following 
a bench trial, the court rejected plaintiff’s use of a survey, because “[a]n ad 
that is truthful on its face cannot be proven to be misleading by surveying 
 
 31.   Id. at 170–71. 
 32.   Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D. Del. 2010), 
aff’d, 653 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 F.3d 883, 886–87 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“A ‘misunderstood’ statement is not the same as one designed to mislead.”); 5 J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:53 (4th ed. 2003). 
 33.   See Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886–87; see also Transcript of Oral Ruling at 70, AT&T 
Mobility v. Cellco P’ship, No. 09 Civ. 3057 (TCB) (N.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2009). 
 34.   See Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886–87. 
 35.   Id. at 886. 
 36.   Id. at 884. 
 37.  702 F. Supp. 2d 238. 
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customers.”38  On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that because 
the label, taken as a whole, was not misleading, “survey evidence has no 
helpful part to play on the question of what the label communicates regarding 
geographic origin.”39 
8.  Possible Influence of Intent on the Relevance of a Communication 
Survey 
A third approach was arguably taken in Merisant Co. v. McNeil 
Nutritionals LLC.40  In that case, the challenged claim was Splenda’s “Made 
From Sugar” tagline, which a competitor argued implied that Splenda 
“contains” sugar or is “natural.”41  There was no factual dispute that Splenda 
ingredients were derived from sugar, but did not actually contain any sugar.  
In denying summary judgment, and distinguishing Mead Johnson, the court 
held that at trial, survey evidence would be admissible because the 
challenged message was ambiguous on its face and, arguably, had been 
designed to mislead.42  Thus, the court appears to have weighed intent as a 
relevant factor on the issue of survey admissibility. 
9.  Trend Away from Consideration of Survey Evidence to Construe 
Advertising Messages 
Critics have argued, based on the Mead Johnson line of cases, that it is 
incongruous for today’s federal judges in Lanham Act false advertising 
lawsuits to shy away from interpreting advertising communications with the 
same amount of confidence as Securities Act disclosures.43  The continued 
development and use of the “necessary implication” principle arguably 
points in the direction of an expanded role for the courts in construing 
advertising claims.  Moreover, in the post-Daubert era, a motion to exclude 
an opponent’s consumer survey as flawed is virtually de rigueur in Lanham 
Act lawsuits,44 and therefore, both parties will typically bear considerable 
expense in dealing with survey evidence. 
 
 38.   Id. at 250. 
 39.   Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 40.   515 F. Supp. 2d 509, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 41. Id. at 514. 
 42.   Id. at 528. 
 43.   Kenneth A. Plevan & Limor Robinson, The ‘Havana Club’ Decision: An Opportunity to 
Reassess the Role of Survey Research in Lanham Act False Advertising Cases, 80 BNA PAT. TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT J. 398, 401 (2010). 
 44.   See, e.g., Kenneth A. Plevan, Daubert’s Impact on Survey Experts in Lanham Act Litigation, 
95 TRADEMARK REP. 596 (May–June, 2005); see also Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys – Social 
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One respected federal judge has pointed out, in a presentation to 
advertising lawyers,45 that the use of surveys introduced in Lanham Act 
advertising cases takes “a very different approach from the securities law,” 
and that, it is one that is “infinitely more time consuming and more 
expensive.  It’s more expensive to the parties[, and] . . . it’s time consuming 
for the court because virtually no survey is free of challenge . . . . So it’s a 
very different approach, and one that I’m not sure makes a lot of sense.”46  
Therefore, Judge Rakoff would give federal judges the same degree of 
freedom to interpret an advertising claim as they have to interpret the 
language in a securities disclosure document.47 
While Judge Rakoff’s views seem opposite to those Judge Lasker 
expressed in 1976, they can be reconciled by recognizing that in 1976, false 
advertising litigation under the Lanham Act was in its infancy.  Judge Lasker 
acknowledged as much when he observed that “few [Lanham Act cases] 
have been brought to our attention which deal with false advertising.”48 
By now, there are hundreds of advertising lawsuits, and numerous 
reported decisions.  It seems reasonable that the federal judges today have 
experience in dealing with such issues, and should have as much confidence 
today to construe advertising claims as the Federal Trade Commission, 
which, as discussed below, considers itself free to construe the meaning of 
advertising claims without the assistance of survey evidence. 
For these reasons, the Mead Johnson and Pernod Ricard courts were 
correct in their approach—if a court finds an advertising communication, in 
context, to be reasonably clear and unambiguous, survey evidence should be 
inadmissible, foreclosing the “misleading,” or implied claim, challenge 
prong.  However, in both Mead Johnson and Pernod Ricard, packaging 
communications were at issue.  In the context of advertising with a greater 
degree of non-verbal images and communications, it will be more likely that 
a court will find the message to the intended audience to be ambiguous, 
leaving the challenger free to rely on survey evidence to show that an implied 
message was communicated. 
 
Science as Evidence, 92 TM REPORTER 957, at 961, n.11 (July–Aug. 2002) (decrying survey experts who 
critique the surveys of others for litigation and invariably “talk glibly of ‘fatal flaws’”). 
 45.  See Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Judge Rakoff Criticizes ‘Peculiarities’ of The Lanham Act, 
LAW360, Sept. 30, 2013, http://www.law360.com/articles/476777/judge-rakoff-criticizes-peculiarities-
of-the-lanham-act. 
 46.   Id. 
 47.   Note that while this paper refers to federal judges because virtually all Lanham Act lawsuits 
are litigated in federal court, the Lanham Act does not provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction, and, 
accordingly, Lanham Act lawsuits could theoretically be litigated in state court as well. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 
(2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
 48.  Am. Brands Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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10.  Pleading Standards for Alleged False Implied Claims; Impact of 
Twombly/Iqbal 
As is now widely known, the Supreme Court recently, in what is often 
referred to as Twombly/Iqbal, made a dramatic change in the Rule 8 
standards for pleading.49  In federal court, causes of action must be 
“plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss, and there is no doubt that these 
new pleading standards apply to Lanham Act cases.50 
A recent decision in the Tenth Circuit applied the Twombly/Iqbal 
plausibility standards to affirm the dismissal of a Lanham Act complaint 
alleging the defendants’ advertising was misleading on the grounds that the 
complaint failed to cite any survey or any other evidence of consumer 
interpretation.  In Vincent v. Utah Plastic Surgery Society,51 several 
“cosmetic” surgeons filed antitrust and false advertising claims against a 
trade association of “plastic” surgeons, and the district court granted a 
motion to dismiss.  On appeal, plaintiffs relied on legal principles that set 
forth standards for alleging and proving that a challenged literal claim was 
false.  The appellate panel found this argument “unnecessary to address” 
because “Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege Defendants’ statements are 
literally false, either on their face or by necessary implication.”52  Turning to 
the alleged false implied claims, the court held that the allegations were 
“wholly unsupported by even a single relevant fact.”53  In a footnote, the 
decision flatly rejected the argument that plaintiffs should be permitted “to 
produce consumer reaction surveys if they are necessary,” observing that 
plaintiffs “have not indicated that they possess any such surveys,” citing 
Twombly.54 
Utah Plastic Surgery Society was designated non-binding precedent, 
and it remains to be seen if other courts applying the Lanham Act will follow 
the reasoning in that case.  The decision points to raising the bar for lawsuits 
asserting that an implied-claim was misleading, as it requires the 
communication survey to have been completed before the lawsuit begins. 
While there was no allegation of literal falsity in Utah Plastic Surgery 
Society, the logic of the opinion suggests that if a plaintiff asserts both 
theories in a complaint, the implied-claim allegations should, in the absence 
 
 49.   See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009). 
 50.   See, e.g., Hall v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 705 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 51.   No. 13–4146, 2015 WL 5090868 (10th Cir. Aug. 31, 2015) (non-binding precedent). 
 52.   Id. at *3 
 53.   Id. 
 54.   Id. at *3, n.7. 
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of survey evidence, be dismissed at the pleading stage even if the allegations 
based on literal claims are not dismissed.  Of course, nothing in the decision 
necessarily suggests that if the lawsuit is not dismissed completely, the 
implied-claim allegations should be dismissed with prejudice.  The Vincent 
decision could also have a significant impact if applied in the consumer class 
action context, as misleading allegations unsupported by survey evidence are 
common in putative consumer class action complaints. 
B.  Role of Consumer Research in State Law Consumer Deception 
Lawsuits 
The recent explosion of consumer deception lawsuits brought as 
putative class actions, filed by private plaintiffs under state consumer 
protection laws, has led to increased use of surveys, in order to address 
factors relevant to merits and class certification issues.  As discussed below, 
these surveys often explore issues other than what the message was 
communicated. Moreover, it is worth noting that one Federal Appeals panel 
recently observed that “the considerable body of federal common law 
construing the [Lanham] Act is instructive in construing the state laws” 
proscribing false or misleading advertising.55 
1.  Determination of Whether a Reasonable Consumer May Have 
Been Misled 
As noted, under the Lanham Act, to challenge a non-literal message 
allegedly communicated typically requires survey evidence showing that the 
message was actually received by the intended audience.  Under state 
consumer protection statutes, the comparable issue appears to be whether the 
challenged statement deceived the “reasonable consumer.”  If so, not only 
does the plaintiff consumer have a valid claim, but the issue could also be 
seen as one common across the class for purposes of arguing class 
certification. 
As discussed below, under the Lanham Act, a survey showing that 25% 
to 30% of consumers in a properly conducted survey received an implied 
(and false) message would normally be sufficient to support a finding that an 
advertising message was misleading.  In a consumer class action, the 
equivalent percentage will presumably be far higher, perhaps 60% or even 
higher, because the class plaintiff is typically seeking class-wide damages, 
not merely an injunction.  Moreover, for a consumer class action in federal 
 
 55.  In re GNC Corp., 789 F. 3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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court, a claimed consumer communication that is facially implausible may 
well not survive a motion to dismiss based on the Twombly/Iqbal 
requirement that allegations be plausible.56 
In Haskell v. Time, Inc.,57 the ubiquitous mailings from Publisher’s 
Clearing House offering sweepstake opportunities for individuals who 
purchased magazine or book subscriptions were at issue.  Noting that 
plaintiff primarily relied on the declarations of a few qualifying customers, 
the court pointed to the absence of “consumer survey evidence indicating 
that a significant portion of the population has been misled by defendants’ 
bulletins.”58  The court concluded that “[p]laintiff has therefore failed to 
prove that defendants’ statements [misled] the reasonable consumer.”59 
In Rahman v. Mott’s LLP,60 a consumer class action, plaintiff 
challenged the “No Sugar Added” statement on a food product label.  
Plaintiff argued that this statement, while literally true, had misled him into 
believing that the product, apple juice, “was lower in sugar and calories than 
comparable brands.”61  On defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court addressed defendant’s contention that no reasonable consumer would 
have been misled by the “No Sugar Added” label.  Given that the challenged 
label statement was literally true, the court held that plaintiff must introduce 
some additional evidence in order to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether 
a reasonable consumer would be misled by the labeling on Mott’s 100% 
Apple Juice.  The testimony of a single consumer in a putative class of 
potentially millions is not enough to meet this burden.62 
With that background, the court in Rahman proceeded to review survey-
related evidence offered by both parties. Defendant’s expert conducted a 
survey of consumers, contending that it showed that very few cited a low 
level of sugar as a reason for their purchase.  In response, plaintiff produced 
the report of a survey expert who (i) opined, without survey evidence, that 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Pelayo v. Nestle USA, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 2d 973 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013)(providing 
several definitions for the term “All Natural” proffered by Plaintiff—including that it means not 
manufactured, that it is not artificial as defined by the FDA, or that none of the ingredients in a “natural” 
product are “synthetic” as defined by the National Organic Program—were all implausible); Kane v. 
Chobani, Inc., No. 12-CV-02425-LHK, 2013 WL 5289253, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2013) (rejecting as 
“simply not plausible” plaintiffs’ allegation that the use of the phrase “evaporated cane juice” in an 
ingredients list communicated that the product only contained natural sugars from milk and fruit with no 
added sugars or syrup). 
 57.   965 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D. Cal. 1997). 
 58.   Id. at 1407–08. 
 59.   Id. at 1408. 
 60.   No. CV 13-3482 SI, 2014 WL 5282106, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2014). 
 61.   Id. at *6. 
 62.   Id. at *9. 
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consumers would likely be misled by the challenged label; (ii) criticized the 
methodology used in defendant’s survey; and (iii) outlined an approach for 
future survey research.63  The court concluded that plaintiff “failed to submit 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether a reasonable 
consumer would be deceived by the ‘No Sugar Added’ statement,” and 
granted summary judgment dismissing all claims requiring plaintiff to show 
that reasonable consumers had been deceived.64 
In In re Conagra Foods, Inc.,65 at issue was a label claim for Wesson 
Oils that the products were “100% Natural.” Plaintiffs, in a consumer class 
action, challenged the label claim as deceptive, alleging that the products 
contained genetically-modified organisms (“GMOs”).66  On plaintiffs’ 
motion to certify various state classes of purchasers, the court reviewed 
survey evidence that plaintiffs relied on to show materiality,67 and accepted 
plaintiffs’ position that those surveys tended to show that consumers 
regarded the “100% Natural” claim as material to their purchasing decisions.  
Observing that the surveys did not directly address the issue of the meaning 
of “100% natural” to consumers, the court nevertheless concluded that 
“plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing for purposes of class certification 
that the ‘100% Natural’ claim is material and that consumers generally 
understand it, inter alia, as a representation that Wesson Oils do not contain 
GMOs.”68 
In Suchanek v. Strum Foods, Inc.,69 at issue were the individual coffee 
pods used in the popular Keurig single-serve coffeemakers.  The defendants 
allegedly entered the market with a compatible pod but, due to patent 
protection, first introduced a pod containing mostly instant coffee, rather 
than fresh ground coffee.  The packaging stated that defendants’ pods 
contained “naturally roasted soluble and microground Arabica Coffee,” but 
“soluble” coffee meant instant coffee, and the pods contained very little 
“microground” coffee.70  Plaintiffs contended that consumers were deceived 
into believing that they were purchasing fresh ground coffee.71 
In concluding that the class should have been certified, the Seventh 
Circuit panel in Suchanek reviewed “[n]umerous expert surveys in the record 
 
 63.   Id. at *10. 
 64.   Id. 
 65.   90 F. Supp. 3d 919 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 
 66.  Id. at 939. 
 67.   Id. at 1018. 
 68.   Id. at 1019. 
 69.   764 F.3d 750, 762 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 70.   Id. at 753. 
 71.  Id. at 753–54. 
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[which] concluded that few consumers understood the true nature of 
[defendants’] product.”72  In a survey conducted by one of plaintiffs’ experts, 
only 14% of participants identified defendants’ product as containing instant 
coffee.73 The defendants’ survey reached a similar result.74  On the issue of 
whether the challenged package was likely to mislead a reasonable 
consumer, the court concluded: “At least three independent expert surveys, 
all employing different methodologies, found that consumers were confused 
about the product.  A jury should have decided the question whether the 
packaging was likely to mislead reasonable consumers.”75 
In Yumul v. Smart Balance, Inc.,76 the plaintiff sought to represent a 
class of purchasers of Smart Balance Nucoa margarine, promoted as 
“cholesterol free,” but allegedly contained artificial trans-fat.  On 
defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court cited and discussed several cases in 
which a court dismissed complaints on the basis of concluding that the 
challenged statements could not, as a matter of law, mislead reasonable 
consumers.  Here, however, the court concluded that it was “appropriate to 
permit plaintiff to attempt to ‘demonstrate by extrinsic evidence, such as 
consumer survey evidence, that the challenged statements tend to mislead 
consumers,’” and therefore, the motion to dismiss with prejudice was 
denied.77 
In Gaston v. Schering-Plough Corp.,78 the plaintiff filed a consumer 
class action contending, inter alia, that a Schering product, Coppertone Sport 
SPF 30 Sunblock, contained false label claims that the product was a 
“UVA/UVB sunblock.” The plaintiff alleged that the product provided 
insignificant protection from the sun’s harmful UVA rays.  In ordering that 
the class be certified, the Court of Appeals panel relied on a consumer survey 
that showed that 77% of sunscreen users believed that the term “sunblock” 
meant protection from “most/all” of the sun’s harmful rays, and that there 
was accordingly a common question among class members.79 
In McCabe v. Crawford, the court noted that surveys, “similar to ones 
used in trademark cases,” were valuable in showing whether a collection 
letter was confusing to the unsophisticated consumer in violation of the Fair 
 
 72.  Id. at 753. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.   Id. 
 75.   Id. at 762. 
 76.   733 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 77.   Id. at 1129 (citation omitted). 
 78.   No. B214935, 2011 WL 3452398 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Aug. 9, 2011, as modified Aug. 25, 2011). 
 79.   Id at *12. 
3 Plevan - FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  2:58 PM 
2016]  USE OF SURVEYS IN ADVERTISING AND CONSUMER DECEPTION DISPUTES 65 
Debt Collection Practices Act.80 Citing Seventh Circuit precedent, the court 
concluded that the “overall message appears to be that on a defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment, if all a plaintiff has to go on is the language 
of the collection letter, he ultimately must lose.”81 
2.  Other Class Certification Issues 
In the discussion above, the surveys were similar to Lanham Act 
consumer communication surveys evaluating the meaning of a challenged 
advertising statement.  In the discussion below, the surveys address related 
but different issues more relevant to the issue of class certification. 
In Algarin v. Maybelline, LLC,82 the court based a number of its class 
certification findings on a consumer survey testing consumer satisfaction and 
consumer motivations and expectations in purchasing the cosmetics at issue, 
which were allegedly falsely advertised as lasting for a full twenty-four hours 
when they actually did not.  Based on the survey results, the court found that 
the class was not sufficiently ascertainable because a number of purchasers 
had no expectations with regard to product duration or believed the products 
would last less than twenty-four hours, and therefore were uninjured.83  The 
court further found commonality lacking due to the variety of duration 
expectations, as well as variances in consumer expectations, motivations, 
and satisfaction.84 
A survey was used in Fairbanks v. Farmers New World Life Insurance 
Co.85 to defeat a showing of materiality. In that case, defendants relied on a 
survey commissioned by plaintiff’s counsel, in which 500 policyholders 
were asked if they would have purchased their policies had it been disclosed 
that the policies were not permanent.  A total of 47.4% of the respondents 
said they would still have purchased the policies.86  Citing the survey results, 
the court found that the materiality issue was subject to individual proof, and 
affirmed the lower court’s denial of class certification.87 
At issue in Astiana v. Kashi Co. were consumer deception claims 
asserted under California law challenging “Nothing Artificial” and “All 
Natural” statements on food products.  On plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class 
 
 80.   272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 745 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 81.   Id. at 745. 
 82.   300 F.R.D. 444, 453–54, 457 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.   Id. at 564–66. 
 85.   197 Cal. App. 4th 544 (July 13, 2011, as modified, Aug. 1, 2011). 
 86.   Id. at 555. 
 87.   Id. at 565–66. 
3 PLEVAN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  2:58 PM 
66 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:1 
of California purchasers, defendant cited to (i) a “marketing survey” that 
showed that consumers equated “natural” with “organic,” and (ii) many of 
the ingredients challenged as not natural were accepted as “organic.”88  
Relying, inter alia, on this evidence, the court only certified classes based on 
ingredients that defendant conceded were not organic.89  In a decision issued 
the same day, the same judge ruled similarly in a lawsuit in which plaintiffs 
sought to represent a California class of purchasers of Bear Naked food 
products labelled as “100% Pure and Natural” or “100% Natural,” relying in 
part on similar consumer research.90 
In Ackerman v. Coca Cola Co., plaintiffs challenged advertising for 
“vitaminwater” which was promoted as a “nutrient-enhanced” water 
beverage.  In opposition to plaintiffs’ motion to certify classes of New York 
and California consumers, defendants offered a consumer survey, among 
other expert analyses, “to demonstrate that consumers have, inter alia, many 
opportunities to be exposed to information about the sugar and calorie 
content of vitaminwater, many different reasons for buying vitaminwater, 
wide variations in awareness of vitaminwater’s sugar and calorie content, 
and varying notions of what is ‘healthy.’”91  Plaintiffs, in turn, sought 
exclusion of the survey with a Daubert challenge.  The magistrate judge 
deferred consideration of those issues, finding that to the extent “these expert 
reports are relevant, it is to the question of whether a reasonable consumer 
would find vitaminwater’s labeling or marketing misleading or deceptive, 
which is a merits-based inquiry.”92  To put this holding in perspective, the 
court had recommended certification of only injunctive, not damages, 
classes.93 
In a lawsuit challenging as deceptive advertising of the health benefits 
of pomegranate juice, In re POM Wonderful LLC Marketing & Sales 
Practices Litigation, the court found that the commonality of the materiality 
issue was satisfied by survey evidence that showed “a significant majority of 
respondents, in excess of 90%, cited health reasons as a motivating factor 
behind their purchase of Pom juice.”94 Another court noted that “survey 
information could substantiate Plaintiffs’ claim that there are shared legal 
 
 88.   Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 508 (S.D. Cal. 2013). 
 89.   Id. at 509. 
 90.   Thurston v. Bear Naked, Inc., No. 11-CV-2985-H BGS, 2013 WL 5664985, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 
July 30, 2013). 
 91.   Ackerman v. Coca Cola Co., No. 09 CV 395 DLI RML, 2013 WL 7044866, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 18, 2013). 
 92.   Id. at *23. 
 93.   Id. 
 94.   No. ML 10-02199 DDP, 2012 WL 4490860, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012). 
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issues among the class members with respect to all or some of [the products 
at issue].”95  In another case, the survey evidence offered to show common 
class issues was rejected for not addressing the proper issues.96 
In Beltran v. Avon Products, Inc.,97 at issue were plaintiff’s allegations, 
on behalf of a putative consumer class, that Avon had misrepresented 
whether any of its products were tested on animals.  In its opposition to 
plaintiff’s motion for class certification, Avon submitted a declaration from 
a marketing professor who, based on an analysis of Avon’s assessment of its 
customer base, including information from business consumer research, 
opined that the issues were not properly the subject of class certification.98 
3.  Possible Ethical Issue 
In many of these state-law consumer deception cases, the defendant 
conducted a pre-certification survey among putative members of the class.  
While there are arguably ethical issues when opposing counsel directly 
communicates with putative class members without prior notice, none of the 
cited cases have raised any ethical issues. One published analysis contends 
that there should be no ethical concern.99 
C.  Surveys in Other Jurisdiction 
1.  Surveys in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings 
In 1972, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) held in In re Pfizer100 
that an advertiser must have a “reasonable basis” for making objective claims 
and that an advertiser must possess substantiation, prior to running the ad, 
for affirmative product claims. Under these cases, if an advertisement 
includes an express or implied statement of support for a claim (e.g., 
“surveys show,” “doctors recommend,” “tests prove”), the advertiser must 
possess the requisite support before making the claim.  With regard to 
 
 95.   Vallabharpurapu v. Burger King Corp., 276 F.R.D. 611, 616 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 96.   In re Front Loading Washing Mach. Class Action Litig., No. 08-51(FSH), 2013 WL 3466821 
(D.N.J. July 10, 2013) (refusing to allow survey expert to testify where questions did not elicit response 
indicating whether or not survey responders had the same mold and odor issues as plaintiffs). 
 97.   867 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 98.   Beltran v. Avon Products, Inc., ECF 97-1, Redacted Declaration of Dr. Joel Steckel in Support 
of Defendant Avon Products, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification. 
 99.   Kenneth A. Plevan & Xiyin Tang, Consumer Research Among Class Members—Is There an 
Ethical Issue?, 104 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION REPORT (2013). 
 100.  81 F.T.C. 23, 29 (1972). 
3 PLEVAN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  2:58 PM 
68 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:1 
consumer surveys offered for non-substantiation purposes, the FTC accepts 
surveys as evidence of both materiality, and for purposes of interpretation.101 
With respect to implied messages, the FTC does not require extrinsic 
evidence in the form of a survey to determine the meaning of an 
advertisement, as the FTC often considers an implied claim to be reasonably 
clear from the face of the advertising.102  The FTC has noted that this 
approach of evaluating an advertisement containing an implied claim by 
examining the face of the advertisement is “primarily useful in evaluating 
advertisements whose language or depictions are clear enough . . . for us to 
conclude with confidence after examining the interaction of all the different 
elements that they contain a particular implied claim.”103  If the FTC is unable 
to determine with confidence what claims are conveyed in a challenged 
advertisement, it then turns to extrinsic evidence.104 
However, if either party introduces extrinsic evidence, the Commission 
will consider that evidence when it reaches its conclusion about the meaning 
of the advertisement.105  Thus, for example, in In re POM Wonderful,106 the 
Commission considered the extrinsic evidence offered by the parties 
including expert testimony, a survey of consumer responses to billboard 
headlines, and evidence regarding the intent of Respondents to convey 
particular messages. 
2.  Use of Surveys in NAD Proceedings 
Generally speaking, the National Advertising Division (NAD) follows 
FTC standards—if reliable, sound survey evidence is submitted, the NAD 
will consider it.107  However, the NAD is free to step into the role of the 
consumer and independently assess the messages reasonably conveyed by 
 
 101.   See, e.g., In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 87 (1989) (introducing survey to determine whether 
calcium in processed cheese slices was claimed to be important by consumers in their purchasing 
decisions); In re ITT Cont’l Baking Co., Inc., 83 F.T.C. 865 (1973) (holding that “market surveys 
demonstrating consumer attitudes toward advertised products are relevant to questions of what 
representations were made about these products,” but that probative weight will depend on “the particular 
facts surrounding the format, methodology, and relevance of the survey questions and design”). 
 102. See Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 103.   In re Thompson Medical Company, 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984). 
 104.   Id. at 788–79. 
 105.  In re Bristol-Myers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21, 319 (1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 106.   2013 WL 268926, at *21 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2013), aff’d, 777 F. 3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 107.   See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (Select 55 Beer), NAD Case Report No. 5233, (Oct. 2010), 
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/); CSC Holdings, Inc. (Optimum High Definition Television Services), 
NAD Case Report No. 4978, (Mar. 2009), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
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the advertising, either because it has rejected a survey for unreliability or 
because no survey has been submitted.108 
D.  Issue of Whether Surveys Can Be Used to Determine Whether an 
Advertising Claim Is Puffery 
Puffery is advertising that typically consists of vague or highly 
subjective representations, often about product superiority, on which no 
reasonable consumer would rely.109  At least one court has held that 
communication surveys serve no purpose in deciding whether a challenged 
claim constitutes puffery.110  The Eighth Circuit held that because puffery is 
not actionable, permitting communication surveys to determine whether 
such a claim is misleading might “blind-side[]” an advertiser and subject it 
to “a wholly unanticipated claim the advertisement’s plain language would 
not support.”111  Surveys are inappropriate to establish that a claim of puffery 
is misleading, because the nature of puffery is vague, “and cannot be 
reasonably interpreted as providing a benchmark by which the veracity of 
the statement can be ascertained.”112 
One district court, nevertheless, held that a survey might be useful to 
determine, as a factual matter, whether an advertisement actually constitutes 
puffery.  In Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc.,113 the court 
determined that this issue “cannot be resolved without surveys, expert 
testimony, and other evidence of what is happening in the real world,” and 
deferred the resolution for trial.114 
E.  Use of Surveys to Substantiate Advertising Claims 
Consider a claim that states: “When doctors and pharmacists were 
asked which they would recommend more often, 8 out of 10 chose PEPCID 
 
 108.   See Priceline.com, Inc. (Name Your Own Price), NAD Case Report No. 5437, (Mar. 2012), 
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/); Your Baby Can, LLC (Your Baby Can Read Early Language 
Development System), NAD/CARU Case Report No. 5313, (Mar. 2011), ASCR (http://case-
report.bbb.org/). 
 109.   United Indus. Corp. v. The Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 110.   Am. Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 393 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the phrase “America’s Favorite Pasta” cannot be transformed into a specific, measurable claim by nature 
of a survey). 
 111.   Id. at 393–94. 
 112.   Id. at 391. 
 113.   309 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 114.   Id. at 407. 
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AC Acid Controller over TAGAMET HB.”115  This claim is an 
“establishment” claim because it explicitly represents that a survey shows 
that professionals prefer the product, and the advertiser, in turn, must have 
an appropriate survey to support, or substantiate, this claim.116  Courts have 
found that when advertising “makes an ‘establishment claim’, a claim 
supported by a test or survey,” the advertisement “will be found to be literally 
false if the test or survey relied upon is unreliable or does not in fact support 
the claim.”117  Likewise, if a claim implicitly represents that it is supported 
by a survey—for example, a claim that “more doctors prefer the patch that 
gives you the choice”—the advertiser must also possess the requisite survey 
support, even if no actual survey is literally cited in the advertising.118 
Claim support surveys, of course, are not communication surveys; 
claim support surveys do not determine what messages the intended 
audience receives. Such surveys must nonetheless meet the standards and 
requisites for reliable survey research. 
F.  Level of Communication Necessary to Show That a Message is 
Implied 
1.  In General 
An issue that often arises with communication surveys is the level of 
communication necessary to demonstrate that an implied message is 
conveyed.  The survey must establish that a “substantial number” of 
consumers took away a misleading impression from the disputed 
advertisement.119  Surveys demonstrating a 20% communication rate or 
higher typically support a finding that there is an implied claim.120  A few 
federal court decisions have indicated that 15% to 16% may also be sufficient 
 
 115.   See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer 
Pharms. Co., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 100 F.3d 943 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 116. See Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that where the 
“defendant’s ad explicitly or implicitly represents that tests or studies prove its product superior, plaintiff 
satisfies its burden by showing that the tests did not establish the proposition for which they were cited”). 
 117.   SmithKline, 906 F. Supp. at 182. 
 118.   Pharmacia Corp. v. GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare, 292 F. Supp. 2d 594, 607 (D.N.J. 
2003). 
 119.   See McNeilab Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 819, 825 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1987, 
as amended Dec. 4 and 7, 1987), aff’d, 848 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 120.   Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2008); see 
also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. QIP Holder LLC, 2010 WL 669870, at *19 (D. Conn. Feb. 19, 2010). 
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in some circumstances.121  The NAD is unlikely to find sufficient evidence 
of deception when a survey reports a rate below 20%.122 
Courts have cited to decisions addressing trademark infringement 
surveys to support the thresholds for false advertising surveys.123  Recently, 
however, the Supreme Court has made it clear that Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act “creates two distinct bases of liability: false association, 
§1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising, §11(a)(1)(B).”124  This language 
suggests that analogies to trademark law may be unhelpful unless justified 
by a relevant and persuasive analysis. 
2.  Net Communication (Levels Adjusted by a Control) 
A reliable survey typically seeks to filter out survey noise, which can 
be created by guessing, pre-conceived views, and/or possible biases in the 
survey design or simply by the artifact of a survey.  One approach is to recruit 
respondents into two groups, a test group and a control group.  The 
percentage of consumers who reported receiving a certain message is then 
calculated by netting out the control group responses from the percentage of 
consumers in the test group who received the advertising message at issue. 
For example, in Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-
Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co.,125 which considered, inter alia, 
whether the name of the product Mylanta Night Time Strength misled 
consumers into thinking the product provides all-night relief, the survey 
expert presented a survey where the first group was exposed to the Mylanta 
Night Time Strength product line as it would appear in retail stores, while 
the control group was exposed to a product not at issue in the litigation, 
Mylanta Extra Strength.  In the first group, approximately 30% of the 
respondents expressed their belief that Mylanta Night Time Strength 
provided relief that lasted the whole night.126  By contrast, fewer than 5% of 
the control respondents believed that Mylanta Extra Strength provided all-
night relief.127  After netting out the “noise” of the control group results, the 
 
 121.   See, e.g., Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 
290 F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 122.   See Wal-Mart Stores v. H-E-B Grocery Co., LP, NAD Case Report No. 5032, 10 (June 2009), 
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 123.   See, e.g., William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995); 
CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10–3542, 2011 WL 1540403, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 
2011). 
 124.   Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014). 
 125.   290 F.3d 578, 590–91 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 126.   Id. 
 127.   Id. 
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survey found a 25% confusion rate among respondents that had been misled 
into thinking Mylanta Night Time Strength provided all-night relief.128 
In McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc.,129 the product at issue, Listerine, was 
advertised to be as effective as floss in a series of television commercials, 
print ads, and hang tags.  The challenger conducted consumer surveys—one 
showed consumers a television commercial and asked what their take-away 
was, and another showed consumers the Listerine bottle with the label at 
issue.  As a control, consumers were asked their “pre-existing beliefs” 
regarding Listerine and floss; “the intent was to determine the number of 
people who did not recall seeing the commercials but who still believed that 
Listerine could be used instead of floss.”130  After netting out the “noise” 
(19%), the survey experts arrived at a 26% to 31% level of communication 
(results in the label and commercial surveys).131 
In American Home Products Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
defendant’s survey expert administered two control surveys. In one of these 
control surveys, survey participants exposed to an ADVIL television 
commercial “indicated that they saw specific superiority claims that ADVIL 
lasted longer, acted faster, and was gentler to the stomach when in fact those 
specific claims were not advanced in the advertisement.”132  In the other 
control survey, “consumers were asked via telephone how long various over-
the-counter analgesics lasted, without the benefit of any advertising copy to 
review.”133  The expert argued that the surveys showed that a “significant 
number of consumers have a general preconception as to [the] duration [of 
plaintiff manufacturer’s ADVIL] that is not informed or influenced by any 
ALEVE advertisement.”134  The court approvingly cited these two control 
surveys to “illuminate the existence of the (unaccounted for) noise in 
[plaintiff ADVIL manufacturer’s] survey.”135 
In LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,136 the court refused 
to exclude a survey that used as a control a commercial of defendant 
Whirlpool advertising another product not at issue, rather than editing the 
test commercial. The court noted that although the “control commercial used 
different imagery, the commercial aired contemporaneously with the test 
 
 128.   Id. 
 129.   351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Id. 
 132.  Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp. 739, 750 (D.N.J. 1994). 
 133.   Id. at 749. 
 134.   Id. 
 135.   Id. at 749. 
 136.   661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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commercial and otherwise covered the same Whirlpool product that the test 
commercial addressed.”137  While the “differences between the test and the 
control may affect the weight that a jury attributes to the study,” such 
differences “are insufficient to find the [study] inadmissible.”138 
In general, a survey reporting message communication in the lower 
range is more likely to constitute acceptable evidence of an implied message 
where that percentage reflects the level of communication net of a control 
level.139  Similarly, where the survey has not accounted for noise, a 
borderline percentage is more likely to be deemed insufficient.140 
3.  Federal Cases 
The lack of a bright-line test for the threshold percentage reflects that a 
court is not bound by a survey’s conclusions but is “obliged to judge for itself 
whether the evidence or record establishes that others are likely to be misled 
or confused.”141  It is well-established that a false advertisement “must 
deceive a substantial portion of the relevant customers,”142 and a deception 
rate of 20% or higher generally satisfies this standard.143  In the gray area 
between 10 to 20%, one court determined that a claim is actionable where 
15% of consumers surveyed took away a misleading message.144  As this is 
in line with trademark cases holding “that survey evidence of 15% confusion 
 
 137.   Id. 
 138.   Id. at 956. 
 139.   See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 
F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 
501 (D. Md. 2008) (finding 24% to 33% net deception); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 1996 
WL 717466, at *6, 9 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1996) (finding 23% to 24% net deception sufficient, even if the 
survey underestimated the noise by a few percentage points). 
 140.   See Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1986, 
amended memorandum and order Oct. 9, 1987) (reporting 18% deception insufficient to establish that 
the advertisement was misleading where noise was not taken into account and survey also had 
questionable methodology). 
 141.   Tyco Indus., Inc. v. Lego Sys., Inc., No. 84-3201 (GEB), 1987 WL 44363, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 
26, 1987), aff’d, 853 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 142.   In re Spirits Int’l, N.V., 563 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 143.   See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Cases 
have held that 20% constitutes a substantial percentage of consumers.”) (citing Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Pharms, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 134 n.14 (3d Cir. 1994)); see 
also Sanderson Farms, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (54.9% “far exceed[s] the level of consumer survey 
evidence usually required by courts”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 
867, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that 25% is not insubstantial). 
 144.   Novartis, 290 F.3d at 594 (holding that survey results showing 15% deception supported a 
likelihood of success on the merits); see also Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., Inc. v. Neutrogena 
Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275 (D. Del. 2010); Sanderson Farms, 547 F. Supp. at 504. 
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is sufficient to demonstrate actual confusion,”145 it may be that these opinions 
equated the two legal doctrines, without any discussion as to whether the two 
analyses should be comparable. 
Courts are unlikely to find deception levels below 10% sufficient 
evidence of deception.  The Ninth Circuit has rejected deception rates well 
below 10% as too small a percentage to support a finding of likely consumer 
deception.146  Similarly, the Third Circuit has opined that a 7.5% rate did not 
constitute a substantial number of consumers.147 
4.  NAD Cases 
The threshold for establishing an implied claim before the NAD appears 
to be somewhat more clearly defined than in federal court.  The NAD has 
generally considered a communication level at or above 20% adequate,148 
with survey evidence demonstrating that 29% of consumer respondents took 
away a message “too high to be ignored.”149 
NAD appears less likely to find that an advertisement conveys a 
message where a survey reports a communication rate below 20% and has 
recognized 15% as “more the exception rather than the rule.”150  For example, 
in Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel Direct Connect/Calling Plans), the 
NAD combined its own impression that the advertisement appeared truthful 
with a survey reporting consumer deception of 12% to find that the 
advertisement was not misleading.151  In another matter, NAD determined 
that a survey reporting deception of 13.3% and 9.4% on various claims, in 
addition to its own analysis of the advertisements, did not establish 
deception, particularly where the net deception levels were 2.9% and 1.9% 
 
 145.   Novartis, 290 F.3d at 594; see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Customer Co., 947 F. Supp. 422, 
425 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (citing multiple cases that considered a 15% confusion rate to be evidence of 
likelihood of confusion). 
 146.   William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that less 
than 3% is not significant); see also Diana Princess of Wales Mem’l Fund v. Franklin Mint Co., 216 F.3d 
1082, 1999 WL 1278044, at *2 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (rejecting false advertising 
claim on the same evidence as the false advertising claim, which failed partially because 6.9% was 
deemed insufficient evidence of actual confusion). 
 147.   Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19 
F.3d 125, 135–36 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 148.   Wal-Mart Stores v. H-E-B Grocery Co., LP, NAD Case Report No. 5032, 10 (June 2009), 
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/) (not finding evidence of deception where net confusion rate was 
always below 18% and generally between 10% and 13%). 
 149.   Kimberly Clark Corporation (Kleenex Ultra Tissue), NAD Case Report No. 3207, 4 (June 
1995), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 150. Wal-Mart Stores v. H-E-B Grocery Co., LP, NAD Case Report  No. 5032, 10 (June 2009), 
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 151.   Nextel Communications, Inc. (Nextel Direct Connect/Calling Plans), NAD Case Report No. 
3934, 13–14 (July 2002), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
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respectively after factoring in noise, and where the methodology and 
tabulation of the net results were questionable.152 
5.  Surveys Measuring False Implied Claims Communicated by a 
Trademark or Brand Name 
A brand product name or trademark itself can communicate a false 
message.  For example, in Novartis Consumer Health v. Johnson & 
Johnson,153 the Third Circuit found that the product name “Mylanta Night 
Time Strength” was misleading because it implied all-night relief.  In that 
case, the court determined that even a 15% confusion rate would be 
sufficient, citing a number of cases, including Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana 
Products, Inc.,154 in the false advertising context.155 
Similarly, the NAD has stated that it does not give special deference to 
product names, for “the mere fact that [a claim] appears on packaging as part 
of the product’s name does not insulate it from a review of its truth and 
accuracy.”156  In Church & Dwight Co., Inc., the NAD recommended a name 
change based on its own interpretation of a “4x” concentration claim, which 
the NAD found was likely to cause consumer confusion by conveying the 
unsupported message that the advertiser’s products are four times more 
concentrated than competing products.157  However, the NAD has also stated 
that mere speculation by an advertiser that a product name may be 
misleading is not enough for the NAD to require an advertiser to change a 
product name—the challenger must submit extrinsic evidence in the form of 
a reliable, well-conducted consumer survey.158 
6.  Jury Instructions 
Where a jury is evaluating an alleged implied claim, the court will likely 
not provide the jury in the jury instructions with a percentage threshold for 
finding confusion.  For example, in Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. v. Del 
 
 152.   MillerCoors, LLC (Advertising for Miller Lite Beer), NAD Case Report No. 5129, 6 (Dec. 
2009), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/); see also Alamo Rent-A-Car (Alamo Rental Cars), NAD Case 
Report No. 3124, 3 (July 1994) ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 153.   290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 154.   690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982), superseded by statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized 
in Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 155.  Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 
578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 156.   Church & Dwight Co., Inc. (Arm & Hammer Liquid Laundry Detergents) NAD Case Report 
No. 5658, (Dec. 2013), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 157.   Id. 
 158.   Bausch & Lomb Inc. (ReNu with MoistureLoc), NAD Case Report No. 4385 (Aug. 2005), 
ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
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Monte Foods Co., a 2012 jury trial involving an alleged misleading 
promotion of packaged fruit, the court gave jurors the standard instruction 
that it was up to them to decide what, if any, weight to give to the testimony 
of the expert survey witnesses.159  While the court presented a list of factors 
that the jurors could find useful to consider—including, for example, 
whether the survey questions asked were non-leading and whether the survey 
had been conducted among a representative sample of the universe of 
consumers—it did not provide a percentage threshold.160 
G.  Foundation Evidence 
In support of the admissibility of survey evidence, the proponent must 
lay a proper foundation, lest a court exclude the survey as not qualifying for 
an exception to the hearsay rule.  An example of an improperly-laid 
foundation is found in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc.161 
The dispute there centered on two competing, purported anti-wrinkle 
creams, one prescription and the other cosmetic.  The challenger attempted 
to introduce three pre-litigation market research surveys that supposedly 
showed the vast majority of consumers were aware of Retin-A’s use for the 
treatment of photo-aged skin.162  The challenger argued that the surveys were 
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.163  The 
court, however, found that the surveys lacked an adequate foundation—
namely, that the sponsoring witness was a “person with knowledge” within 
the meaning of the rule.164  The witness testified that Ortho regularly 
conducted market research and commissioned such research by hiring 
independent contractors.165  The court nevertheless found that the witness did 
not personally commission the work, did not play any role in its preparation, 
did not see the original data, and lacked knowledge of the steps that the 
outside survey contractor took in preparing the report.166  Therefore, the court 
excluded the surveys as hearsay.167 
 
 159.   No. 1:08-cv-08718-SHS (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2008). 
 160.  Id.; see also Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc. v. Del Monte Foods Co., 933 F. Supp. 2d 655 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 161.   828 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 162.   Id. at 1118. 
 163.   Id.; FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 164.   Ortho Pharm. Corp., 828 F. Supp. at 1119. 
 165.   Id. 
 166.   Id. 
 167.   Id. at 1121. 
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H.  Proving Damages with Survey Evidence 
As noted, if a communication survey determines only the message 
received by the target audience, then presumably something more is needed 
to show a diversion of sales, such as damages. 
Under the Lanham Act, a challenger must meet a higher standard to 
recover damages than to obtain an injunction, often referred to as the need to 
show causation.168  Of course, a survey can help demonstrate causation by 
showing that the implied message has affected purchase decisions, but for 
this, the survey must go beyond measuring communication.169 
It is interesting to consider that a survey showing net communication of 
30%, for example, may be considered sufficient to obtain an injunction if the 
implied claim is shown to be false.  However, in this example, arguably 70% 
of the members of the target audience were not confused, thus undercutting 
any damages claim. 
III.  SPECIFIC ISSUES IN THE DESIGN OF COMMUNICATION SURVEYS 
AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
No matter how well a party thinks its communications survey is 
designed, an expert for the opposing party will invariably opine that it is 
“fatally flawed.”170  This section examines a number of the more frequently 
litigated issues relating to the design of communication surveys.  Design 
shortcomings can affect the weight accorded to survey results,171 as well as 
lead to the exclusion of the survey.172 
 
 168.  See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1392 (2014) 
(“Even when a plaintiff cannot quantify its losses with sufficient certainty to recover damages, it may still 
be entitled to injunctive relief . . . .”); TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 
2011) (affirming denial of damage award where plaintiff failed to provide any proof of causation); 
Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 318 (1st Cir. 2002) (“In order to 
prove causation under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, the aggrieved party must demonstrate that the false 
advertisement actually harmed its business.”); Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 
191 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that inability to show lost sales does not bar injunctive relief, though it would 
bar monetary relief). 
 169.   See Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc. v. Nutro Prods., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(holding that plaintiff was unable to show that it had been injured where survey only showed consumer 
deception, but not how it influenced purchasing decisions or loss of sales). 
 170.   See, e.g., Rappeport, supra note 44, at 96, n.11 (decrying survey experts who critique the 
surveys of others for litigation and invariably “talk glibly of ‘fatal flaws’”). 
 171.  See, e.g., Bruce Lee Enters., LLC v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 10 CV. 2333 (KMW), 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 31155, at *65 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (“The evidentiary value of a survey’s results rests upon 
the underlying objectivity of the survey itself.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 172.  See Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Systems, Inc., No. 10-cv-01221-PAB-CBS, 2012 WL 2153162, at 
*11 (D. Colo. June 13, 2012) (“‘It is the trial court’s responsibility to determine the probative value of a 
consumer survey, and it is appropriate for the trial court to accord little or no weight to a defective 
survey.’”) (citing Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Olymco, Inc., 1995 WL 499466, at *12 (6th Cir. 1995)); Procter & 
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As a consequence of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.173 
and its progeny, as well as Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the district courts 
are authorized to act as “gatekeepers” with respect to all expert testimony.  
That necessarily led to the question of what the post-Daubert standards 
would be for surveys offered in Lanham Act cases.  In a leading case 
addressing that issue, Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc.,174 the Second Circuit 
firmly established the majority rule that generally, most alleged defects in 
survey methodology go to the credibility, and not the admissibility, of a 
survey, and thus surveys should rarely be excluded from evidence in Lanham 
Act cases. 
Plaintiff Schering, the manufacturer of Claritin, concerned that a 
competitor was misrepresenting the non-sedative properties of a competing 
prescription drug, commissioned a survey among physicians whom the 
competitor’s representatives visited.175  The survey allegedly confirmed that 
false claims were being delivered, and Schering filed a false advertising 
Lanham Act lawsuit, which ended with a settlement.176  Schering then 
conducted additional surveys to monitor compliance with the terms of the 
settlement, and filed a second lawsuit based on the survey results.177  In the 
course of discovery, plaintiff found surveys commissioned by the 
competitor, and moved for a preliminary injunction, citing in support a total 
of five surveys.178  The district court granted defendants’ Daubert motion to 
exclude the five surveys, and denied the preliminary injunction.179 
On plaintiff’s appeal, the Second Circuit held that several of the surveys 
should have been considered, and remanded for reconsideration of the 
admissibility of the others.180  To reach this result, Judge (later Justice) 
Sotomayor conducted an exhaustive analysis of the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule pursuant to which survey evidence can be admitted.181  On the issue of 
 
Gamble Pharms., Inc. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 0034 (PAC), 2006 WL 2588002, at *27 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (“A survey is considered to be properly conducted if the survey was fairly and 
scientifically conducted by qualified experts and impartial interviewers . . ., if the questions upon which 
the results relied do not appear to be misleading or biased, and if the recordation of responses was handled 
in a completely unbiased manner.”) (quoting Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri, Inc., 
758 F. Supp. 512, 524 (E.D. Mo. 1991)). 
 173.   509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 174.   189 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 175.  Id. at 222. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 222–23. 
 178.  Id. at 223. 
 179.  Id. at 221. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 227–39. 
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surveys considered under the state-of-mind exception in Rule 803(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, the court held that “errors in methodology . . . 
properly go only to the weight of the evidence—subject, of course, to Rule 
403’s more general prohibition against evidence that is less probative than 
prejudicial or confusing.”182 
A.  Property Defined Universe 
A threshold question in survey design is whether the survey’s “universe 
was properly defined.”183  Among other concerns, this means that those 
taking the survey must fall within the group of the advertised product’s target 
customers. 
1.  Surveying The Target Audience 
The proper survey universe refers to “that segment of the population 
whose perceptions and state of mind are relevant to the issues in the case.”184 
Essentially, those taking the survey must be within the group expected to 
purchase the advertised product or service. This is because a respondent who 
is not a potential candidate to purchase the product will not likely have any 
interest in the product’s promotion. Therefore, the respondent will be more 
likely to give unthinking or flippant responses to the survey questions.  Such 
a respondent also may not have a sufficient understanding of the product’s 
market context to provide meaningful or useful responses. 
Courts have noted that advertising surveys polling the wrong universe 
have little probative value.185  “[E]ven if the proper questions are asked in a 
proper manner, if the wrong persons are asked, the results are likely to be 
irrelevant.”186 The universe should be defined so that survey respondents 
represent “the person[s] to whom the advertisement is addressed” and can 
answer questions such as “what does the public perceive the message to 
 
 182.   Id. at 228. 
 183.  See LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 952 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (listing 
criteria for evaluating the “trustworthiness of survey evidence”) (quoting Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. 
Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). 
 184.   PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:159 (4th ed. 2003)). 
 185.  Id.; Kwan Software Eng’g, Inc. v. Foray Techs., LLC, No. C 12-03762 SI, 2014 WL 572290, 
at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1328 (N.D. Ga. 
2008). 
 186.  6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:159 
(4th ed. 2015). 
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be?”187  This can be accomplished by targeting the survey toward the 
advertiser’s customer base.188  Surveys that have left out defendants’ primary 
customers have an improper universe.189 
2.  Prospective Purchasers Versus Past Purchasers 
There has been debate about whether a properly defined universe 
should be limited to prospective purchasers, or include past purchasers as 
well.  What complicates the issue is the frequency of repurchase.  To 
illustrate the issue, consider a consumer of a product that is typically used or 
consumed frequently, such as a soft drink. Regular consumers of soft drinks 
are likely to continue purchasing the product frequently, and therefore recent 
past purchasers are in the target market.  By contrast, a recent purchaser of a 
more durable item, such as a refrigerator, will likely not be in the market for 
a new one for many years. Therefore, a recent purchaser of a refrigerator will 
not likely find advertisements for refrigerators to be of any interest. 
Several courts have held that the proper universe includes both groups, 
particularly where past purchasers are likely to buy the product again.190  
Others, however, have discounted surveys that included past purchasers but 
left out prospective purchasers.  For example, in Merisant Co. v. McNeil 
Nutritionals, LLC, the court noted that it is typical to survey prospective 
consumers, and held that the survey proponent did not sufficiently explain 
why past users were in the appropriate universe in that case.191 
The survey need not match the advertising audience precisely, as the 
survey will be admissible if the survey respondents represented a 
“sufficiently close approximation of the recipient pool.”192  However, 
 
 187.  Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Prods. Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 246, 258 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 297–98 
(2d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted)). 
 188.  KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (properly 
conforming survey participant group to demographics supplied by the defendant and to those segments 
of the population whom the expert saw using or showing interest in defendants’ Portrait Studio). 
 189.   Id. at 972. 
 190.   See Millennium Importing Co. v. Sidney Frank Importing Co., No. 03-5141 (JRT/FLN), 2004 
WL 1447915, at *8–9 (D. Minn. June 11, 2004) (properly including past purchasers of vodka who were 
likely to purchase vodka again, where the universe was further limited to respondents who indicated they 
were likely to read one of the magazines in which the ad was printed). 
 191.  242 F.R.D. 315, 322 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 192.  PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2011) (lower court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert’s online consumer survey about infant formula where 
the respondents were “located by a third party” and “pre-screened to ensure that they were (1) new parents 
or expecting a baby in the next six months, (2) were open to considering purchasing infant formula, (3) 
were not participating in the Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition Program, and (4) were or would be 
the primary or shared decision maker in choosing infant formula brands”). 
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selection of survey locations should not unfairly favor one party over the 
other.  For example, a mall survey was held to have a properly defined 
universe where it was conducted at a neutral location, a mall in which neither 
party had a presence.193 
B.  Representative Sample 
Selecting the appropriate sample of respondents is crucial to survey 
implementation, because the reactions of the polled sample should attempt 
to represent the genuine reactions of the defined universe.194 
1.  Screening Questionnaire 
The evidentiary value of a communication survey also depends on 
whether the survey screens users to properly define the survey’s universe.195 
Therefore, respondents are typically screened before answering substantive 
communication questions in order to make sure that they qualify for the 
survey, and courts have found a failure to do so undercuts the legitimacy of 
the entire survey.196 One reason for screening is to ensure that respondents 
do not have biases that would affect the accuracy of the survey, such as 
employment by the company whose product is being advertised. 
Respondents are also screened out if they do not fall within the proper 
universe of potential consumers of the advertised product.197 
2.  Sample Size and Probability Sampling 
If the sample is too small, survey results might not properly measure 
the meaning average consumers perceived, and courts will generally give 
 
 193.  Foto Fantasy, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d at 972. 
 194.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 186. 
 195.   See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 447 (D.N.J. 
June 5, 2009) (holding that a survey was improperly conducted in part because it failed to use survey 
questions to screen out the correct sample population). 
 196.   Id. (holding respondents were not screened to ensure they were in the correct universe was “a 
critical flaw in the design of the survey, which makes it significantly less useful for determining whether 
consumers who were making the actual purchasing decision were deceived, a critical question in this 
case”). 
 197.   See Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 
F.3d 578, 591 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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less weight to the survey.198  Between 200 and 300 participants is often 
considered an adequate sample size for a communication survey.199 
Nonprobability sampling is common.200 However, surveys that utilize 
probability sampling, such as telephone surveys, were traditionally preferred 
because probability sampling meant that each possible respondent had an 
equal chance of being selected.201 One common, traditional way to conduct 
a nonprobability sampling survey is the “mall intercept” method.202  In a 
national survey, the survey expert will typically select malls in 
geographically diverse areas of the country, for example four malls in each 
of the four census regions—Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Mall 
surveys are routinely accepted for communication surveys.203 
3.  Internet Surveys 
Nonprobability sampling may also be conducted through internet 
surveys, a method which numerous courts have now accepted for 
communication surveys.204  Courts review internet surveys with the same 
emphasis on relevant questions and technical adequacy as they use when 
 
 198.   See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Bluesky Med. Corp., SA-03-CA-0832, 2006 WL 6505346, 
at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2006) (holding that a different court holding the sample size too small in a 
survey of 52 participants with only 27 in the test group distinguishable from a sample of 75 physicians 
and 60 nurses, which was “sufficiently large to provide meaningful results”). 
 199.   David Bernstein & Bruce Keller, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING, MARKETING AND PROMOTIONS 
§ 3.03 (2015) (citing In re Northland Cranberries, Inc., NAD Case Report No. 3948 (Aug. 2002), ASCR 
(http://case-report.bbb.org/)). 
 200.  MCCARTHY, supra note 186. 
 201.  See id. 
 202.  See, e.g., Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 315, 325–26 (E.D. Pa. 2007) 
(denying motion in limine to exclude survey that employed the mall intercept method using 23 malls 
spread out across the country). 
 203.  See Fancaster, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 832 F. Supp. 2d 380, 405 (D.N.J. 2011) (rejecting expert’s 
testimony that mall surveys, because they are not projectable, cannot be relied on in litigation, and stating 
that courts have repeatedly accepted mall surveys in litigation). 
 204.   See, e.g., T-Mobile US, Inc. v. AIO Wireless LLC, 991 F. Supp. 2d 888, 907 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
3, 2014) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the online presentation of a consumer survey affected its 
weight); PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (admitting “without 
difficulty” an expert testimony based on an internet survey of prescreened individuals who viewed an 
advertisement online then dialed a toll-free number to answer questions about it); Doctor’s Assocs. v. 
QIP Holder LLC, Civil Action No. 3.06-cv-1710 (VLB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14687, at *56 (D. Conn. 
Feb. 19, 2010) (holding that an internet survey that exposed consumers to a 30-second advertisement 
followed by a series of questions to assess their reactions was admissible); R&R Partners, Inc. v. Tovar, 
447 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1155 (D. Nev. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that internet surveys are 
unreliable). 
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reviewing the adequacy of phone or in-person surveys, and admit internet 
surveys as evidence if these surveys satisfy those same requirements.205 
However, monitoring the sample composition in Internet surveys can 
be difficult. Without information about the selection of the sample, courts 
have criticized survey evidence, whether compiled from internet surveys, as 
not probative.206  One court criticized the universe of an AOL poll as 
“[p]resumably . . . comprised of people who happened to have been online 
while AOL released this poll, and cared enough about the issue to mouse-
click on a box,” and described the sample as the “least representative 
imaginable.”207 
C.  Fair Presentation of the Commercial Stimulus 
To appropriately test the typical reaction of a consumer, the 
presentation of the commercial stimulus should mimic a typical viewing 
context.208 
There has been debate about the amount of time that survey respondents 
should be exposed to visual stimuli, such as print advertisements or product 
labels. Courts have emphasized the need to realistically replicate the 
market.209 Permitting the respondent to have access to the advertisement 
 
 205.   See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.Com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1246 (10th Cir. 2013) (affirming 
the trial court’s exclusion of an online questionnaire, because the questions asked were ambiguous, but 
not because the survey was conducted online). 
 206.  See, e.g., In re Front Loading Washing Mach. Class Action Litig., Civil Action No. 08-51 
(FSH), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96070, at *21–23 (D.N.J. July 10, 2013) (excluding expert testimony of 
an internet survey on reliability grounds because the survey asked only general questions and because the 
expert lacked information on whether the respondents received compensation, how many respondents 
there were, whether each response was from a unique individual or whether the respondents actually 
owned the product at issue); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d  339, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“There is no indication of whether the universe from which these respondents were chosen was a 
properly defined universe, or whether the 3,116 respondents constituted a representative sample of that 
universe. Without any information as to the composition and selection methodology of the survey sample, 
the [survey] is simply not probative of irreparable injury.”); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 
2d 1302, 1324-25, 1334-35 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding survey did not create a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to consumer confusion where the survey targeted an overbroad universe and used a non-
random sample). 
 207.  Merisant, 242 F.R.D. at 328 n.11 (internal citations omitted). 
 208.   See POM Wonderful LLC. v. Organic Juice USA, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 188, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (finding the weight of an online survey is diminished where it fails to replicate real world 
conditions); Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Management, Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 
1037–38 (9th Cir. 2010) (failing to replicate real world conditions, affecting the weight of the survey 
evidence); Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 693–94 
(W.D. Ky. 2010) (holding survey evidence was not useful or persuasive where the survey created an 
environment that was dissimilar to that which a typical consumer would encounter), aff’d, 679 F.3d 410 
(6th Cir. 2012). 
 209.  See Church & Dwight Co., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 893, 910 (D.N.J. 
1994) (“In a Lanham Act false advertising case, it is crucial that the survey evidence presented to the trier 
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throughout the survey might reduce the survey’s probative value, because 
respondents could view the stimulus for unrealistic periods of time.210  
However, several decisions have indicated that the stimulus should be visible 
to respondents for the duration of the survey.211 
With respect to audio-visual stimuli such as television commercials, the 
generally accepted practice is to show the stimulus twice to respondents, in 
order to ensure the survey is conducted in a “generally objective and fair 
manner.”212 Where a video was embedded on a webpage, the “fact that the 
respondents were not shown the text from the webpage may severely 
undercut the survey’s reliability.”213 
D.  Question Design 
Of considerable importance is the objectivity of the question design—
a fact-specific inquiry that is subject to case-by-case analysis.214  Survey 
questions must not be leading or suggestive, and must be designed to probe 
whether consumers actually take away the message being tested.215 
Courts have cited open-ended questions as preferable to closed-ended 
or multiple choice questions,216 but closed-ended or multiple choice 
questions have been found to be reliable when filter questions are asked,217 
and a “don’t know” or “not sure” choice is included to help avoid guessing 
by survey participants.218  Survey design typically provides specific 
 
of fact most closely replicates consumers’ ‘real world’ perceptions of the contested advertisement.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 210.  Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 871 F. Supp 739, 761 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding 
that the survey suffered from “improper technique” because of the “extended time the participant was 
permitted to study[,] . . . view[,] and review [the free-standing coupon insert] during the course of the 
entire survey interview, which typically lasted from 10 to 15 minutes”); see MCCARTHY, supra note 186 
(defining a “reading test”). 
 211.   See, e.g., Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 
129 F. Supp. 2d 351, 366 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[L]eaving the products for the respondents to examine rather 
than taking the products away replicates market conditions”) (citing Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 170 
F.3d 286, 297 (2d Cir. 1999)), aff’d, 290 F.3d 578 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 212.   See, e.g., McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 244–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 213.  POM Wonderful, 769 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 214.   LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 956 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009) 
(“‘The probative value of any given survey is a fact specific question that is uniquely contextual.’”) 
(quoting Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 
300–01 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 215.   See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
960 F.2d 294, 300 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 216.   See, e.g., id. 
 217.   See, e.g., LG Elecs, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 955. 
 218.   See, e.g., id. (finding the use of closed-ended questions, proper particularly when the questions 
included a “don’t know” option); L & F Prods. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 845 F. Supp. 984, 998 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994), aff’d, 45 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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instructions to participants not to guess.219 A survey is “not credible if it relies 
on leading questions which are ‘inherently suggestive and invite guessing by 
those who did not get any clear message at all.’”220 
1.  Open-Ended Questions 
Communication surveys invariably start with open-ended questions that 
make broad general inquiries such as “What was the main message of the 
advertisement?” or “Aside from trying to get you to buy the product, what 
are the main ideas the commercial communicates to you?”221 Responses to 
general, open-ended questions provide the “most persuasive evidence” of 
consumer confusion.222 
The NAD has also expressed a preference for open-ended questions, 
which are “better indicators of how consumers interpret a commercial 
message,” because respondents’ answers are not influenced by the 
suggestions contained in the questions themselves.223  Closed-ended 
questions may be used, but should be reserved for situations where it is 
necessary to have respondents choose between the parties’ different 
interpretations of an advertisement, or where an open-ended approach would 
not assess subtle differences in meaning that are at the heart of the dispute.224 
2.  Filter Questions 
Courts are more receptive to multiple-choice questions when they are 
preceded by filter questions that screen out respondents who did not take 
away any message on a certain topic of interest.225  Filter questions have been 
described as questions that probe whether a relevant topic was 
communicated to the consumer, and thus insulate from the possible 
suggestive nature of multiple-choice questions.226 
 
 219.   See, e.g., Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 561, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (“The leading nature of the questions asked and the lack of instructions against guessing flawed 
[the] surveys.”). 
 220.   Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19 
F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568, 
581 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 221.   See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
960 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 222.   Id. at 300. 
 223.   Campbell Soup Co. (Campbell’s Select Harvest Soup), NAD Case Report No. 4981, at 21 (Mar. 
2009), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 224.   Id. 
 225.   See Procter & Gamble Pharms., Inc. v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2006 WL 2588002, at *23 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). 
 226.   Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 
578, 591–92 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Filter questions themselves should not be leading or suggestive, and the 
narrower follow-up questions should not be overly suggestive.  For example, 
the follow-up questions in Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer 
Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer227 were found to be flawed, 
because they were too suggestive and phrased in such a way that there was 
only one logical way for respondents to answer.  The claim at issue was 
whether referring to an antacid tablet as the “strongest” implied that it 
provided better relief when it actually only proved to be “stronger” at 
neutralizing acid in a laboratory test.  The follow-up question used in the 
survey asked respondents what “strongest” meant to them, and the court 
found that the only logical answer would be to elaborate on the “strongest” 
claim in relation to acid relief.228  Otherwise, a respondent may have simply 
taken away from the commercial that “strongest” simply meant “strongest” 
at acid neutralization in a chemical sense.229 
However, the follow-up questions used in another antacid case “met a 
proper filter question threshold and could be accorded significant weight.”230  
Those questions asked more generally whether the product label 
communicated anything about how long the product would provide relief 
and did not ask respondents to focus on any particular element of the product 
label.231  Thus, the questions did not lead respondents to provide any 
particular answer or allow for only one logical response. 
The NAD has also endorsed filter questions and “believes that a 
progression from open-ended to increasingly focused questioning” is a better 
technique for soliciting unbiased evidence as to how respondents interpret 
implied messages than using leading questions.232  After filtering out viewers 
who did not receive any message relating to the claim in dispute, the 
interviewer can ask the remaining viewers follow-up questions to determine 
what message a particular aspect of an advertisement conveyed.233 
3.  Leading or Suggestive Questions 
In Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp.,234 the Second Circuit rejected survey results 
 
 227.  19 F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 228.  Novartis, 290 F.3d at 592 (interpreting Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., 19 F.3d at 135). 
 229.   Id. 
 230.   Id. at 593. 
 231.   Id. 
 232.   Merial Ltd. (Frontline Plus Flea & Tick Treatment), NAD Case Report No. 3844, (Dec. 18, 
2001), ASCR (http://case-report.bbb.org/). 
 233.   Id. 
 234.   960 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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based on leading questions and upheld a district court finding that the only 
persuasive evidence of consumer confusion came from open-ended 
questions inquiring about the overall message communicated by the 
commercials at issue.  In that case, the defendant, who manufactured the 
antacid medication Tums, aired commercials that showed the plaintiff’s 
antacid, Mylanta, along with a list of its active ingredients, including 
aluminum and magnesium.  The commercial touted Tums, which uses 
calcium carbonate as the active ingredient for acid neutralization, as being 
“[c]alcium rich [and] aluminum free.”235  The plaintiff claimed these 
commercials misled consumers to believe that the aluminum or magnesium 
in Mylanta was harmful. 
The plaintiff conducted a survey that asked both open-ended questions 
and more narrowly focused questions about the commercials.  Based on the 
results of the narrow questions, the plaintiff’s expert concluded that 45% of 
the relevant respondents were misled.236  The Second Circuit upheld the 
district court’s rejection of the survey results, which were based on questions 
it considered to be leading: (i) “What, if anything, does the commercial 
communicate to you about the aluminum and magnesium in Maalox and 
Mylanta?”; (ii) “What else, if anything, does the commercial communicate 
to you about the aluminum and magnesium in Maalox and Mylanta?”; and 
(iii) “Based on the commercial you just saw, how do you feel about taking a 
product for heartburn that contains aluminum and magnesium?”237  These 
questions were found to be leading, because they flagged the allegedly 
misleading specific message in the commercial for the attention of the survey 
respondent.238  The court considered as persuasive evidence only the answers 
to the broad, open-ended questions: “Aside from trying to get you to buy the 
product, what are the main ideas the commercial communicates to you?” and 
“What other ideas does the commercial communicate to you?”239  Only nine 
of the 300 answers to those questions mentioned aluminum or magnesium 
content as a potential danger, and the court found the 281 other answers, 
which did not mention aluminum or magnesium, to be the most persuasive 
evidence of the ultimate message communicated by the commercials—one 
that did not mislead consumers.240 
 
 235.   Id. at 295. 
 236.   Id. at 300. 
 237.   Id. at 299. 
 238.   Id. at 300. 
 239.   Id. at 299–300. 
 240.   Id. at 300. 
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This case offers an example of a typical strategy in disputing the results 
in a survey—arguing that the closed-ended questions or the follow-up 
questions should be discounted or ignored as leading, while pointing to the 
main idea/other ideas questions, showing that the challenged message was 
not being communicated. 
4.  Closed-Answer Questions 
Courts often give little or no weight to survey evidence based on 
questions that force respondents to choose an answer from a closed universe 
of options, especially when respondents are not given a “don’t know” or “not 
sure” option.241  For example, the survey used by the plaintiffs in Gillette Co. 
v. Norelco Consumer Products Co.242 asked respondents “Which, if any, of 
these wet razors looks most like the wet razor shown in the commercial you 
just saw?” while displaying twelve razors to the respondent.  The court 
considered this question to be “markedly suggestive,”243 even though the 
question allowed respondents to choose no razor. The court found that the 
question nonetheless led respondents to attempt to find a razor that most 
resembled the razor from the commercial, even when they would not have 
made the association without the prompt.  However, the court noted that such 
a closed-ended question might be acceptable if it instead followed an open-
ended question that filtered out respondents who did not think that the 
commercial’s image of a razor was similar to or evocative of an actual razor 
on the market.244 
Closed-ended questions are not inherently leading.  A well-designed 
closed-ended question can survive the lack of filter questions.  In LG 
Electronics U.S.A, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,245 the court noted that “the 
purpose of a filter question is to reduce guessing” and rejected Whirlpool’s 
criticism of the lack of filter questions, finding that the survey’s use of “don’t 
know” in the close-ended question sufficiently mitigated this concern to 
allow admission of the survey. 
Courts have also allowed variations on a multiple choice design to serve 
as evidence of the implied communication.  For example, in Sanderson 
 
 241.   See, e.g., Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a 
survey partially because “the interviewers conducted the survey in this case in a way that effectively 
required the respondents to express a specific opinion, even if they did not have an opinion, by specifically 
not offering the respondents the opportunity to give ‘not sure’ as a response”) (emphasis in original). 
 242.  69 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 243.   Id. 
 244.   Id. at 261–62. 
 245.   661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
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Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,246 respondents were read a series of 
statements and told that some, all, or none of the statements may have been 
implied by or stated in the advertisement at issue.  Respondents were then 
told to answer: “(1) yes, the statement was implied; (2) no, the statement was 
not implied; (3) I don’t know whether the statement was implied; or (4) no 
opinion.” 
5.  Off-Target Questions 
Survey questions may be improper if they do not reach an issue in the 
case.  For example, in Scotts Co. v. United Industries Corp.,247 survey 
questions that employed the same ambiguous language as the advertisement 
at issue were disregarded as non-persuasive.248  The main issue in that case 
was whether the advertisement conveyed that the fertilizer being advertised 
would kill mature crabgrass—which was not true—or if it would merely 
prevent the growth of new crabgrass—which was true.  The survey asked: 
“Based on your review of this section of the bag, should this product prevent 
the growth of [mature] crabgrass?”249  The court found that “[t]hrough the 
use of the word ‘prevent,’ this question suffer[ed] from the same ambiguity” 
as the contested packaging itself.250  Therefore, the court noted that although 
more than 90% of the respondents answered “yes” when asked whether the 
advertisement implied that Vigoro prevents the growth of crabgrass, those 
responses shed no light on the key question to the false advertising claims—
whether the advertiser’s packaging “conveys the message that it can kill 
mature crabgrass.”251 
Similarly, in Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Laboratories,252 the 
plaintiff conducted a survey asking respondents what they believed the 
phrase “1st Choice of Doctors” meant, as used to describe defendant’s baby 
formula in the advertisement.  The Seventh Circuit found the survey 
unpersuasive because it asked respondents to consider “1st Choice” as 
representing a threshold percentage of doctor preference rather than the real 
meaning of “first”—number one in a series. 
Surveys may also suffer from asking questions that are too narrow and 
fail to consider the broader, more fundamental issues in the case.  For 
 
 246.   547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 501–02, 507 (D. Md. 2008) (issuing preliminary injunction). 
 247.   315 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 248.  Id. at 280. 
 249.   Id. at 279. 
 250.   Id. 
 251.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 252.   201 F.3d 883, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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example, the ultimate flaw that the court found with the survey used in 
Gillette Co. v. Norelco Consumer Products Co.253 was that it only asked 
which razor the animated razor looked like and thus failed to consider what 
the court considered the real issue—whether the commercial was comparing 
the advertised product to any other product at all. 
In Design Resources, Inc. v. Leather Industries of America,254 plaintiff, 
an upholstering supplier, asserted false advertising claims against a trade 
association in response to defendant’s advertisements warning that some 
upholstery suppliers were using leather scraps in their products.  Plaintiff 
attempted to use a survey commissioned by one of the defendants to 
demonstrate that consumers understood the allegedly misleading advertising 
to be directed at bonded leather, which plaintiff argued was synonymous 
with its products at the time.  However, the survey responses made no 
mention of plaintiff’s products; no respondents gave an answer that could be 
interpreted as a belief that plaintiff or its products were specifically or 
impliedly referred to in the advertising.255  Therefore, the court held that the 
survey failed to provide evidence of consumer confusion, and, if anything, 
appeared to disprove plaintiff’s case. 
E.  Interview Procedure and Validation 
The procedures employed when conducting a survey must be proper 
and objective. The survey expert must select competent interviewers who do 
not pose a risk of tainting evidence with questionable tactics. The expert 
must also use double-blind interviewing procedures, in which neither the 
interviewer nor the participant knows why the survey is being conducted, 
who the sponsor is, or what answers the sponsor hopes to obtain.256  The 
anonymity of the sponsor is essential to avoid bias in the survey results.257 
Improper interview procedures, particularly when combined with other 
surveying errors, may lead to exclusion of the survey.  In Procter & Gamble 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,258 data collection flaws 
that rendered the survey inadmissible included: failure to collect non-
 
 253.   69 F. Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 254.   789 F.3d 495, 503–04 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 255.   Id. 
 256.   See Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (D. Md. 2008) 
(accepting as reliable and persuasive a double blind survey); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson 
& Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 590 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 257.   See Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker State Co., No. Civ. A. 00-251, 2000 WL 1556019, at *11 
(D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2000). 
 258.   No. 06 Civ. 0034 (PAC), 2006 WL 2588002, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006). 
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response information; destruction of original interview forms; flawed 
interviewer and screening instructions; failure to comply with instructions 
provided to site supervisors; failure to address differences in handwriting, 
including the same handwriting under different interviewers’ names and 
different handwriting under the same interviewer’s name; and inclusion of 
unqualified interviewers. 
A properly conducted survey must follow post-survey validation 
procedures to confirm the reliability of the survey process. However, the 
threshold for what courts consider to be acceptable validation is not 
exceedingly high. In post-interview validation, an independent third party 
contacts the identified respondents to confirm that they actually participated 
in the survey and provided answers.259  For example, in one case, after the 
survey was complete, the survey expert enlisted an independent telephone 
interviewing service to verify the responses and to detect any fraud by the 
interviewers.  Specifically, the interviewing service contacted respondents 
by phone to verify that the respondents: (1) existed, (2) met the universe 
requirements, and (3) recalled completing the interview.260  One survey 
expert testified that it is customary in the industry to be able to successfully 
validate only 15 to 25% of responses,261 and another survey expert noted that 
the 40% validation rate obtained in that case exceeded industry norms.262 
F.  Coding 
Parties often disagree over whether certain individual responses to 
open-ended questions actually convey deception.263  In one NAD decision,264 
the challenger, Schick, alleged that Gillette’s advertising for the Venus 
Divine razor conveyed to consumers that the Venus Divine would provide 
post-shave moisturizing benefits to users, whereas Gillette argued that the 
ads only conveyed that the Venus Divine provided moisturizing during, and 
not after, shaving. In challenging the persuasiveness of Schick’s consumer 
survey, Gillette argued that Schick’s survey experts improperly coded all 
 
 259.   See Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, 242 F.R.D. 315, 324–25 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (noting 
that “validation is indeed important”). 
 260.   LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 661 F. Supp. 2d 940, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 261.   Id. 
 262.   Merisant, 242 F.R.D. at 325. 
 263.   See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(finding that, in coding a survey regarding toothbrush commercials, the expert inappropriately considered 
responses that referred to “ultrasound” and “sonic vibrations” as perceiving that the ultrasound alone 
cleaned teeth). 
 264.   Gillette Co. v. Schick Mfg., Inc., NAD Case Report No. 4305 (Apr. 2005), ASCR (http://case-
report.bbb.org/). 
3 PLEVAN - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/29/16  2:58 PM 
92 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 15:1 
answers to open-ended questions that discussed moisturizing—both during 
and after shaving— as evidence of deception.  Gillette’s experts re-coded the 
answers based on the verbatims provided by the Schick survey to obtain what 
they believed to be a more realistic figure for the number of misled or 
confused consumers. The experts concluded that after taking into account 
answers to follow-up questions in cases of ambiguity, only 17.6% of 
respondents were misled, a much lower percentage of respondents than the 
51.6% claimed by Schick.  NAD then undertook independent coding of the 
responses based on the verbatim responses.265 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
To the extent there appears to be an emerging trend, the use of 
communication and other survey evidence in Lanham Act false advertising 
lawsuits is on the decline, whereas the opposite is occurring in state law 
consumer class action cases.  Accordingly, the legal principles governing the 
use of surveys in these disputes continues to be of interest to lawyers who 
advise clients on truth-in-advertising issues. 
 
 
 265.   Id. at 27. 
